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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the use of aggregate and microeconometric decompositions to 
compare benefit-incidence results over time and across regions. Decompositions are 
applied to explore changes in targeting in health policies directed to pregnant women 
and children under 4 in Argentina. The results suggest that although health public 
programs are pro-poor, incidence changes in the last 5 years have been pro-rich due 
to two different factors: a substantial reduction in the fertility rate of poor couples, 
and an increase in the use of public facilities by wealthier households, likely 
triggered by the economic crisis that Argentina has suffered since 1998.   
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1. Introduction   
A benefit-incidence analysis allows an assessment of the degree of targeting of average 
public spending. Although incidence results of particular programs are useful on their 
own, more can be learnt from the comparison of results over time and across regions. 
This paper illustrates the usefulness of decomposition techniques to shed light on the 
factors behind differences in benefit-incidence results between time periods, regions or 
programs.   
 
In particular, changes in the benefit-incidence results for a particular health service are 
decomposed into three components: (i) changes in individual and household 
characteristics linked to the decision to consume that health service, (ii) changes in the 
way decisions whether to consume the service or not are made, and (iii) changes in the 
public/private decision to where to consume the service. Both aggregate and 
microeconometric decompositions are implemented to provide estimates of these three 
components. Results of the decompositions are useful for the understanding of the 
reasons why a given health program has become less or more pro-poor over time, or why 
a program is less or more pro-poor in one region than in another.  
 
The methodology is applied to the case of health policy directed to pregnant women and 
children under 4 in Argentina. This country has undergone dramatic changes in its 
economic and demographic structure in the last decade, which might have some impact 
on the targeting of public policies. In fact, the paper finds that although health public 
programs are pro-poor, incidence changes in the last 5 years have been pro-rich due to 
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two different factors: a substantial reduction in the fertility rate of poor couples, and an 
increase in the use of public facilities by wealthier households, likely triggered by the 
economic crisis that Argentina has suffered since 1998.   
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the results from a typical 
benefit-incidence analysis for different health services. Section 3 is the core of the paper 
as aggregate and microeconometric decomposition techniques are introduced, and the 
main results are shown and discussed. Some brief comments in section 4 close the paper.  
 
2. Benefit-incidence results   
Argentina has traditionally had good levels of health status/services indicators, at least 
when compared to other Latin American countries. The health system is organized 
around a strong participation of the public sector, which besides regulating health 
services, it owns and operates an extensive network of public hospitals and primary 
health care centers (PHCC). The public health system is universal: no requirements are 
needed to use most of the services in public health facilities. However, in practice 
expenditures are mostly targeted to low and middle-income families, as more affluent 
household usually opt-out of public facilities. Most public health policies are channeled 
through the network of public hospitals and PHCCs. In these health facilities people have 
access to all sorts of health services, mostly free of charge. In this study we concentrate 
the analysis on the following services to pregnant women and children under 4: antenatal 
care, attended delivery, visits to a physician, medicines and hospitalizations. 
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Argentina has had a disappointing economic performance over the last three decades. 
Figure 2.1 shows large cyclical fluctuations in the disposable mean income, without signs 
of an increasing trend. The vertical lines in the Figure indicate the period covered by this 
analysis, 1997 to 2001, a period of substantial income fall. Per capita disposable income 
in real terms fell 13% between 1997 and 2001 according to National Accounts estimates. 
Along with a stagnant economy, Argentina has suffered dramatic transformations in its 
income distribution.2 Inequality and poverty have substantially increased over the last 
three decades, and in particular in the period 1997-2001.    
 
Benefit-incidence analysis is aimed at evaluating the degree of targeting of average 
public spending in a specific program. Benefits from the program are assigned to 
individuals according to their answers to a household survey on the program use.3 We 
first describe the data used for the analysis and then present and discuss the basic results.  
 
The data  
 
Benefit-incidence analyses require household surveys with data on a welfare indicator 
and information on the use of social programs. In the last decade Argentina has 
conducted two Living Standard Surveys with questions on the use of various health and 
nutrition services. The first survey, known as Encuesta de Desarrolo Social (EDS), was 
conducted in 1996/7 and includes 73,410 individuals (representing 83% of total 
                                                 
2 See Gasparini (2003).  
3 See van de Walle and Nead (1995) and van de Walle (1998). More recent assessments of these techniques 
and their problems are in Bourguignon, Pereira da Silva and Stern, (2002) and Carneiro, Hansen and 
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population) living in urban areas. The second survey, Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida 
(ECV), with similar coverage and questionnaires, was conducted in 2001.  
 
Both surveys include questions on housing, some assets, demographics, labor variables, 
health status and services, and education. The EDS and ECV were sponsored by The 
World Bank and have questionnaires similar to those in other countries.4 However, they 
are not part of the Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) program and they do 
not include questions on expenditures as the LSMS surveys do.5     
 
Welfare indicators  
 
A crucial stage in a benefit-incidence analysis is sorting households by a welfare 
indicator. Among the variables usually included in a household survey household 
consumption adjusted for demographics is the best proxy for individual welfare (Deaton 
and Zaidi, 2002). Unfortunately, most household surveys in Argentina, including the 
EDS and the ECV, do not have household-expenditures questions. This paper uses 
household income adjusted for demographics, or equivalized household income, as the 
individual welfare indicator. Equivalized household income y for each individual is 
defined as  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Heckman (2002). For benefit-incidence analysis in Argentina see Flood et al. (1993), Harriague and 
Gasparini (1999),  Gasparini et al. (2000) and DGSC (2002).  
4 See http://www.siempro.gov.ar/Encuesta%20de%20desarrollo%20social/encuesta%202001/encuesta.htm 
for more information on the surveys.  
5 They are usually labeled as quasi-LSMSs.  
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( )θαα 2211 KKA
Yy ++=  
 
where Y is total household income, A is the number of adults in the household, K1 the 
number of children under 5, and K2 the number of children aged 6 to 14. Parameters αs 
allow for different weights for adults and kids, while θ regulates the degree of household 
economies of scale. Following Deaton and Zaidi (2002) and given the characteristics of 
the Argentinean economy, we take intermediate values of the αs (α1=0.5 and α2=0.75), 
and a rather high value of θ (0.9) as the benchmark case. Per capita household income 
can also be viewed as a particular case of equivalized income with no differential weights 
(all αs equal to 1) and no economies of scale (θ=1).  
 
In Table 2.1 individuals with consistent answers and positive reported household income 
are grouped in quintiles. The table shows mean income of each quintile for the 
distribution of per capita household income and equivalized household income. 
Argentina underwent a recession between 1998 and 2002, which shows up in Table 2.1: 
incomes fell along the distribution.   
 
The use of health services and nutrition programs 
 
This study is focused on health programs targeted to pregnant women and children under 
4. Table 2.2 shows the share of children by quintiles of the distribution of equivalized 
household income. By construction quintiles have 20% of total population. Instead, since 
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the number of children per household is decreasing in income, the share of children is not 
uniform along the income distribution. For instance, the share of children under 4 was 
30.1 in the bottom quintile and 12.1 in the top quintile in 1997. This fact will have a 
fundamental consequence on the distributional incidence of public programs directed to 
children. Even a universal program to all children will be pro-poor, given the negative 
correlation between the number of children and household income. This relationship 
became less strong between 1997 and 2001, as a consequence of a fall in the fertility of 
low-income families relative to the rest,6 implying, other things equal, a potential 
reduction in the targeting of social policies.  
 
The public sector finances public health facilities. These resources allow public hospitals 
and centers to provide health services free of charge or at subsidized prices. Who are the 
beneficiaries of this subsidy? A usual assumption is that the users of the service and their 
families are the beneficiaries of the public program. By using a public health service free 
of charge a family saves the cost of buying that service, which is assumed to be equal to 
the average cost of public provision.7  
 
Table 2.3 shows benefit-incidence results for five health services: antenatal care, attended 
deliveries, visits to doctors, free medicines and hospitalizations. More details on each of 
these services and results for other services can be obtained from a companion paper 
(Gasparini and Panadeiros, 2004). Subsidies to antenatal care in public facilities are 
                                                 
6 Marchionni and Gasparini (2003) report a similar trend for the Greater Buenos Aires area using 
information from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares. 
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highly pro-poor. In 1997 more than 46% of total beneficiaries of this program belonged 
to the first quintile of the income distribution. The share of beneficiaries from the top 
quintile was 2%. The degree of targeting of the public subsidy to antenatal care decreased 
between 1997 and 2001. Similar results are obtained for the rest of the health services.  
 
Table 2.4 shows the concentration index (CI) of each service, a measure of the extent to 
which a particular variable is distributed unequally across the income strata (see Lambert, 
1993). Negative numbers reflect pro-poor programs. The higher the CI in absolute value 
the more pro-poor the program.  
 
Concentration indices are computed from household survey data. Surveys are just a 
sample of the population. Even with a stable population the computed value of an index 
may change if we take two different samples. Hence, it is important to compute the 
statistical significance of the changes in a given statistic, like the CI. This practice is a 
rigorous way of assessing whether the recorded change in the statistic is large enough to 
be reasonably confident on the fact that the statistic also changed in the population. 
Although benefit-incidence results are typically subject to the problem of sample 
variability, they are never complemented with a statistic-significance analysis. In this 
paper confidence intervals are computed using bootstrapping techniques.8 Table 2.4 
shows the limits of the 95% confidence interval below the value of each CI estimate.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Notice that the factors used in the production of the service are not considered beneficiaries of the public 
provision: it is assumed that doctors and nurses could find a similar job in the private sector if the public 
sector decided not to provide health services. 
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All health programs considered are pro-poor. The free delivery of medicines seems to be 
the most pro-poor program. Between 1997 and 2001 there has been a decrease in the 
degree of targeting in all health services. This fall is illustrated in Figure 2.2 where all the 
concentration curves for the health programs in 2001 are below the corresponding curves 
for 1997. The next section explores these changes with the help of decompositions.  
 
3. Characterizing changes in targeting  
Benefit-incidence results come from aggregating individual decisions on the consumption 
of publicly provided services. A household will consume a given service if (i) at least one 
of its members is eligible for that service, (ii) she (or her parents) decides to consume the 
service, and (iii) she decides to do it in the public sector. Accordingly, differences in 
targeting of a given program over time or across regions are the result of differences in 
the three stages described above. It is relevant to identify to what extent the change in the 
degree of targeting for a given program is the result of changes in the socio-demographic 
structure of the population, or the result of changes in the household decisions on the 
consumption of the service (whether to consume the service or not, and where to do it). In 
this section this question is tackled using aggregate and microeconometric 
decompositions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 For the use of bootstrapping techniques for distributional analysis, see Mills and Zandvakili (1997) and 
Sosa Escudero and Gasparini (2000) for the case of Argentina.  
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Aggregate decompositions  
 
Suppose we group total population in quintiles h=1,…,5 according to their equivalized 
household income. The proportion of total users of a given health service j in a public 
facility that belong to quintile h in time t is denoted as bhjt. These proportions are the 
inputs of any benefit-incidence measure. If bhjt is decreasing in income, it is said that the 
public program j is “pro-poor”. The value bhjt can be written as 
 
hjthjthjthjt paqb ..=  
 
where qhjt is the proportion of people who qualify for service j who belong to quintile h, 
ahjt is the rate of use of service j in quintile h relative to the population mean, while phjt is 
the share of users in the public sector in h relative to the population mean. Differences 
among quintiles in the value of b are driven by differences in q, a, and p.  
 
Let us illustrate this decomposition with the case of antenatal care by medically trained 
persons. Obviously, only pregnant women qualify for this service. If pregnant women are 
not uniformly distributed along the income distribution, the value of q will differ across 
quintiles. In most countries fertility rates are decreasing in income, which implies a value 
of q decreasing in income for health services related to pregnant women and children. All 
other things constant this pattern will imply a pro-poor bias for any health service 
directed to that population.  
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The relative use of a given service (summarized by a) is the second determinant of the 
incidence results. Keeping all the other things constant, if in contrast to pregnant women 
from rich households, most women from poor households decide not to see a medically-
trained person for antenatal care, the value of a will be increasing in income. Finally, the 
choice public/private is the third crucial determinant of the incidence results. If poor 
pregnant women choose a public facility more often than rich women, the value of p will 
be decreasing in income.  
 
Differences in the pattern of the bs, and then in the incidence results over time and across 
regions depend on differences in the right-hand-side factors of the previous equations. 
We use this simple decomposition to get a preliminary characterization of differences in 
incidence results over time and across regions in Argentina.  
 
Table 3.1 shows the results of the decomposition of incidence results by quintiles for 
different health programs. The first three panels in each table reproduce results for q, a, and 
p. The distribution of potential users, the participation decision and the choice 
public/private determine the incidence results of the fourth panel. The differences in 
incidence by quintile are reported in row 5.  
 
There is a clear reduction in the degree of targeting of the public program of antenatal care. 
While in 1997 46.5% of total beneficiaries of that program belonged to the bottom quintile 
of the equivalized income distribution, in 2001 that share fell to 43.3. This drop of 3.2 
points has its complement in the gains of 1.6 for the quintile 3, 1 for quintile 4 and 0.6 for 
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the top quintile. Where does this reduction in targeting come from? The last panel helps us 
to characterize the incidence changes by showing decomposition results. The line labeled 
potential users shows incidence results if we change the distribution of pregnant women 
(first panel) between 1997 and 2001 but we keep fixed the participation rates and the 
public/private decisions at the values of a given year. Since the values of a and p can be 
fixed at two alternative years, in the Table we report the average over the 4 possible 
simulations.  
 
The distribution of pregnant women became less pro-poor between 1997 and 2001, 
implying a 1.4 drop in the incidence on the bottom quintile. This means that everything 
constant, the demographic changes would explain a sizeable part of the decrease in the 
degree of targeting of the subsidy to antenatal care in public hospitals and primary health 
centers. Poor women are now more likely to be seen by medically trained persons. This 
increase in participation (combined with the changes for the rest of the distribution) implies 
an increase in incidence on the bottom quintile of 0.9 points. The last effect, labeled public 
provision, seems the most relevant one: although the use of public hospitals increased for 
poor people it increased proportionally more for the rest of the population. This effect 
implies a sizeable drop in the degree of targeting in the bottom quintile.  
 
Table 3.1 also shows results for attended deliveries. Participation rates are assumed to be 
unchanged since no information is available for 2001. The reduction in the degree of 
targeting on the bottom quintile between 1997 and 2001 is again the consequence of a 
reduction in the relative fertility rate of poor women, and a relative increase in the use of 
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public facilities by non-poor women. In contrast with the case of antenatal care, the first 
effect seems to be the dominant one. Similar results are obtained for the case of public 
subsidies to medicines. The incidence of public hospital admissions increased a bit for the 
bottom quintile, and decreased a lot for the second one, leading to a fall in the overall 
degree of targeting as measured by the concentration index. This fall for the second quintile 
is explained by a relative reduction in fertility, a large drop in the share of hospitalized 
children, and a less pronounced increased in the use of public facilities, compared to other 
quintiles of the distribution.  
 
Aggregate decompositions can also be applied to study differences in incidence results 
across regions. Table 3.2 shows results for deliveries and visits to doctors in 1997.9 
Differences between two regions in incidence results are the consequence of differences in 
the distribution of potential users, the participation rates and the choice of public facilities.  
The Table shows the decomposition of differences between the North and GBA. Similar 
results can be obtained for any other two regions from the information of  the Table. There 
is a substantial difference in the degree of targeting of the public subsidy to deliveries in 
public hospitals between the North and GBA. Most of that difference comes from a much 
more concentrated distribution of children under 4 in the bottom quintile of the national 
income distribution in the North than in GBA. While 19.5% of children under 4 in GBA 
belong to the bottom quintile of the national distribution of equivalized household income, 
that share rises to 44.1% in the North. 23.8 out of the 28.5 points of the incidence 
                                                 
9 We consider 4 regions: the North, the Center, the South, and the Greater Buenos Aires (GBA).  The North 
is the poorest region of the country. GBA is a large metropolitan region with 1/3 of total population. The 
South (Patagonia) is the least populated and richest region, with the lowest indices of inequality and 
poverty. 
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difference for the bottom quintile between the two regions are explained by this population 
effect. If all women chose public hospitals to have their babies, a subsidy to deliveries in 
public facilities would be more pro-poor in the North, since the population in that region is 
considerable poorer than in the GBA. In the North even without much effort for a better 
targeting, public programs are usually more pro-poor.  
 
In addition to the population effect, the difference in targeting in favor of the North is 
accounted by a less intensive use of public facilities by the rich in the North compared to 
the GBA. Similar results apply to visits to doctors in 1997 and to all health services in 2001 
(see Table 3.3).   
 
Microeconometric decompositions (microsimulations) 
 
Although certainly informative the aggregate decompositions are rough approximations 
of the effect on the benefit-incidence results of changes in the structure of the population, 
the decision of consuming a given health service, and the public/private choice. A more 
sophisticated analysis can be performed with the help of microeconometric (or 
microsimulation) decomposition techniques.10 Suppose we are interested in analyzing 
changes between t and t´ in the concentration index (CI) for the program of visits to 
doctors in public facilities. The idea behind this methodology is to simulate for each 
individual the counterfactual decision of whether to visit a doctor in a public hospital or 
not in time t if certain factors were those of time t´ instead of those observed in time t. 
We consider three set of factors that can be alternatively changed between t and t´: (i) the 
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characteristics of each individual (and her family), (ii) the way these characteristics are 
linked to the decision of visiting a doctor, and (iii) the way these characteristics are linked 
to the choice of attending a public facility instead of a private one.  
 
To implement this methodology we estimate econometric models of the decision of 
visiting a doctor, and the conditional decision of attending a public facility as functions of 
various individual and household characteristics. Changes in the concentration index are 
decomposed into three effects. The population effect is obtained by simulating the health 
decisions in time t if the individual and household characteristics were those of  time t´; 
the participation effect comes from simulating each individual’s health decisions in time t 
if the parameters that govern the decision to visit a doctor were those of time t´, while the 
public provision effect is computed by assuming that the parameters governing the 
public/private decision were those of time t´.  
 
To explain the methodology analytically, suppose there are there are N individuals 
indexed with i=1, …,N. Each individual i is defined by a vector of individual observable 
characteristics Xi and a vector of individual unobservable characteristics Ui. Individual 
characteristics include age, gender, education as well as household characteristics as 
income and location.  
 
People who qualify for a given health service j can use a private or a public provider. Let 
bijt be a binary variable that identifies people who get the service j in the public sector at 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 For the use of microsimulation techniques to distributional problems see Bourguignon et al. (2003).  
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time t (beneficiaries of public expenditures in the program j). As before, this variable can 
be expressed as 
 
ijtijtijtijt paqb ..=  
 
where now q is equal to 1 if the individual qualifies for the service and 0 otherwise, a is 
equal to 1 if the individual decides to use the health service and 0 otherwise, and p is 1 if 
the individual uses a public provider. Variable q is deterministic:  
 
),( jtitijt XQq α=  
 
Given observable characteristics Xi an individual qualifies or not for the service (e.g. 
being pregnant qualifies for antenatal care). The vector of parameters α determines the 
rule of access to a given service.   
 
Variables a and p instead are random variables as they depend on unobservable factors.  
 
),,( jtititijt UXAa β=  
  
),,( jtititijt UXPp γ=  
 
Combining the previous equations  
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),,,,( jtjtjtititijt UXBb γβα=  
 
A measure of distributional incidence of public expenditures in service j is a combination 
of the distribution of b and of certain characteristics Y of the vector X (e.g. household 
income) 
 
}){},({ itijtjt YbII =  
 
where Y ∈X. Hence,  
),,},{},({ jtjtjtititjt UXFI γβα=  
 
A similar equation can be derived for other time period t1 
 
),,},{},({ 111111 jtjtjtititjt UXFI γβα=  
 
We define three effects in which the change in I between t and t1 can be decomposed:  
 
Participation effect 
 
),,},{},({),,},{},({ 111111111 jtjtjtititjtjtjtititj UXFUXFPA γβαγβα −=  
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This effect captures the change in incidence resulting from a change in the parameters 
governing the decision of consuming a given service (β).  
 
Public-provision effect 
 
),,},{},({),,},{},({ 1111111 jtjtjtititjtjtjtititj UXFUXFPP γβαγβα −=  
 
This effect measures the change in incidence as the consequence of changes in the 
parameters governing the public/private decision.  
 
Population effect 
 
),,},{},({),,},{},({ 11 jtjtjtititjtjtjtititj UXFUXFPO γβαγβα −=  
 
This effect measures changes in incidence resulting from changes in the distribution of 
observable and unobservable characteristics of the population.  
 
Assuming α  does not change, the change in I can be expressed as  
 
jjjj POPPPAI ++=∆  
 
A similar procedure can be applied to analyze regional differences in the benefit-
incidence results, by considering t as a regional rather than a time index.  
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 Some of the functions and parameters in the decomposition are either know or assumed, 
and some should be estimated. We observe the function and parameters that determine 
potential users (Q and α) and vector X. We assume a form for A and P, and propose a 
benefit-incidence index I. We estimate parameters β and γ and the vector of 
unobservables U.  
 
Table 3.4 reports the results of performing the decompositions. The first row shows the 
change in the absolute value of the concentration index between 1997 and 2001 for each 
health service, while the last three rows show the values of each of the effects. The 
concentration index for the program of antenatal care in public facilities went down 4.8 
points between 1997 and 2002, implying lower targeting. If only the way individual 
decisions on pregnancy controls are taken had changed between 1997 and 2001, the CI 
would have increased 0.4 points, which represents a negligible change. The effect of the 
changing public/private decisions between 1997 and 2001 contributed with 1.7 points in 
the overall fall of the CI. The most significant factor in this fall was the change in the 
population characteristics. Even with all parameters kept constant, the change in 
characteristics would have contributed to the reduction in the CI with 3.5 points. The 
reduction in the number of children in poor families is likely the main factor behind this 
result.  
 
The large relevance of the population effect is also present for attended deliveries, 
medicines and hospitalizations. The public provision effect is negative, except for 
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attended deliveries, likely reflecting an increasing number of middle and high-income 
groups attending public hospitals as the result of the economic crisis. The participation 
effect is negligible in all cases, except for hospitalizations, which is a sign of the increase 
in hospitalizations for children from the poorest quintile.  
   
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper illustrates the use of decompositions techniques to contribute to the 
understanding of benefit-incidence results of health services. The paper analyzes the 
degree of targeting of health policies directed to pregnant women and children under 4 in 
Argentina, using information from two Living Standards Measurement Surveys (1997 
and 2001). By performing a benefit-incidence analysis I find that health public programs 
are pro-poor. However, the results of aggregate and microeconometric decompositions 
suggest that incidence changes in the last 5 years have been pro-rich, due to two different 
factors: a substantial reduction in the fertility rate of poor couples, and an increase in the 
use of public facilities by wealthier households, likely triggered by the economic crisis 
that Argentina has suffered since 1998.  
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Table 2.1 
Mean incomes by quintile 
Distribution of equivalized household income 
     Per capita income      Equivalized income
1997 2001 1997 2001
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
1 54.6 38.1 75.4 52.7
2 120.9 93.0 159.6 121.9
3 196.9 156.9 248.8 198.4
4 321.1 263.9 393.6 322.1
5 853.9 704.6 1000.1 823.9
Mean 309.5 251.3 375.6 303.8
 
Source: authors´ calculations based on the EDS and ECV. 
 
Table 2.2 
Children by quintiles 
Distribution of equivalized household income 
                 Children under                  Children under 
                   2 years-old                    4 years-old
1997 2001 1997 2001
(i) (ii) (i) (ii)
1 29.7 27.6 30.1 27.8
2 24.6 21.7 24.5 21.6
3 19.1 20.1 18.4 20.4
4 13.6 15.6 14.8 15.6
5 13.0 15.1 12.1 14.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: authors´ calculations based on the EDS and ECV. 
 
Table 2.3 
Benefit-incidence results  
Distribution of equivalized household income 
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Antenatal care
1997 46.5 26.8 17.7 7.0 2.0 100.0
2001 43.3 26.8 19.3 8.0 2.5 100.0
Change -3.2 0.0 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.0
2. Attended deliveries
1997 44.5 27.7 17.9 7.1 2.7 100.0
2001 41.9 27.0 18.4 9.5 3.2 100.0
Change -2.6 -0.8 0.5 2.4 0.4 0.0
3. Visits to a doctor
1997 45.1 29.6 15.6 6.9 2.8 100.0
2001 43.2 27.5 19.1 6.7 3.4 100.0
Change -1.9 -2.1 3.6 -0.1 0.6 0.0
4. Medicines
1997 51.6 26.1 14.8 6.1 1.4 100.0
2001 49.4 21.7 16.3 8.7 3.9 100.0
Change -2.2 -4.4 1.4 2.6 2.5 0.0
5. Hospitalizations
1997 42.5 35.0 15.1 5.9 1.5 100.0
2001 44.5 17.5 27.1 9.1 1.8 100.0
Change 2.0 -17.5 12.0 3.2 0.3 0.0
l
 
Source: authors´ calculations based on the EDS and ECV. 
 
Table 2.4 
Concentration indices  
    Health services 1997 2001
   Antenatal care -46.9 -42.9
(-48.4, -45.8) (-44.5,-41.1)
   Attended delivery -45.3 -41.4
(-46.4, -43.8) (-43.0,-39.1)
   Visits to a doctor -44.0
(-44.9, -43.1)
   Medicines -51.0 -38.7
(-53.5, -48.4) (-41.7,-36.6)
   Hospitalizations -46.6 -37.2
(-49.9, -44.3) (-43.3,-33.1)
 
Source: authors´ calculations based on the EDS and ECV. 
Note: 95% confidence intervals below concentration index estimates. 
Intervals computed by bootstrap with 200 replications.  
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Table 3.1 
Aggregate decomposition of incidence results  
Health services, 1997 and 2001 
 
Antenatal care 
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1. Potential users
1997 29.7 24.6 19.1 13.6 13.0 100.0
2001 27.6 21.7 20.1 15.6 15.1 100.0
2. Participation
1997 94.8 96.3 99.5 99.4 98.4 97.1
2001 97.6 96.5 97.6 98.5 99.2 97.7
3. Public provision
1997 81.6 56.0 46.0 25.7 7.6 51.6
2001 85.6 68.1 52.4 27.7 9.0 54.9
4. Incidence
1997 46.5 26.8 17.7 7.0 2.0 100.0
2001 43.3 26.8 19.3 8.0 2.5 100.0
5. Difference -3.2 0.0 1.6 1.0 0.6
6. Effects
   Potential users -1.4 -2.1 1.7 1.4 0.4
   Participation 0.9 -0.2 -0.5 -0.1 0.0
   Public provision -2.7 2.4 0.4 -0.2 0.1
 
Attended deliveries 
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Potential users
1997 29.7 24.6 19.1 13.6 13.0 100.0
2001 27.6 21.7 20.1 15.6 15.1 100.0
2. Participation
1997 98.3 99.4 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.3
2001 98.3 99.4 99.9 100.0 100.0 99.3
3. Public provision
1997 79.5 59.4 49.1 27.3 10.9 53.4
2001 83.4 67.5 49.5 33.0 11.3 55.0
4. Incidence
1997 44.5 27.7 17.9 7.1 2.7 100.0
2001 41.9 27.0 18.4 9.5 3.2 100.0
5. Difference -2.6 -0.8 0.5 2.4 0.4
6. Effects
   Potential users -1.5 -2.2 1.7 1.5 0.6
   Participation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
   Public provision -1.1 1.5 -1.2 1.0 -0.1
l
 
Medicines 
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Potential users
1997 30.1 24.5 18.4 14.8 12.1 100.0
2001 27.8 21.6 20.4 15.6 14.6 100.0
2. Participation
1997 24.2 25.6 26.6 28.5 26.2 25.9
2001 51.6 52.0 57.8 54.8 63.1 55.5
3. Public provision
1997 49.7 29.2 21.4 10.1 3.1 27.2
2001 64.8 36.4 25.9 19.1 8.0 32.3
4. Incidence
1997 51.6 26.1 14.8 6.1 1.4 100.0
2001 49.4 21.7 16.3 8.7 3.9 100.0
5. Difference -2.2 -4.4 1.4 2.6 2.5
6. Effects
   Potential users -1.7 -1.9 2.3 0.7 0.6
   Participation 0.6 -0.9 0.6 -0.6 0.3
   Public provision -1.1 -1.6 -1.5 2.6 1.6
l
 
Hospitalizations 
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Potential users
1997 30.1 24.5 18.4 14.8 12.1 100.0
2001 27.8 21.6 20.4 15.6 14.6 100.0
2. Participation
1997 8.8 10.6 6.9 7.1 7.0 8.4
2001 9.6 6.8 10.9 9.1 4.5 8.4
3. Public provision
1997 84.3 70.5 62.1 29.1 9.2 63.1
2001 91.9 66.0 67.3 35.1 15.0 65.4
4. Incidence
1997 42.5 35.0 15.1 5.9 1.5 100.0
2001 44.5 17.5 27.1 9.1 1.8 100.0
5. Difference 2.0 -17.5 12.0 3.2 0.3
6. Effects
   Potential users -1.8 -2.2 3.0 0.6 0.4
   Participation 2.7 -12.2 8.7 1.6 -0.8
   Public provision 1.1 -3.2 0.4 0.9 0.7
l
Source: authors´ calculations based on the EDS and ECV. 
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Table 3.2 
Aggregate regional decomposition of incidence results, 1997  
 
Deliveries 
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Potential users
North 44.1 26.4 14.6 10.0 4.8 100.0
Center 32.1 23.2 19.7 13.7 11.3 100.0
South 27.5 20.3 22.7 15.6 13.9 100.0
GBA 19.5 25.4 20.6 15.2 19.3 100.0
Argentina 29.7 24.6 19.1 13.6 13.0 100.0
2. Participation
North 94.5 98.0 98.0 99.7 97.9 96.6
Center 95.7 99.2 100.0 99.5 99.9 98.3
South 98.2 99.0 98.3 100.0 99.6 98.9
GBA 93.4 92.6 100.0 99.0 97.6 96.1
Argentina 94.8 96.3 99.5 99.4 98.4 97.1
3. Public provision
North 83.2 58.4 39.3 15.2 7.1 59.3
Center 77.0 42.7 40.2 16.6 0.8 45.0
South 81.5 65.3 52.8 40.7 23.0 57.3
GBA 86.2 65.5 52.8 35.4 9.2 52.2
Argentina 81.6 56.0 46.0 25.7 7.5 51.6
4. Incidence
North 60.6 26.4 9.8 2.7 0.6 100.0
Center 54.1 22.4 18.1 5.2 0.2 100.0
South 39.0 23.3 20.9 11.2 5.6 100.0
GBA 32.0 31.4 22.2 10.8 3.5 100.0
Argentina 46.5 26.8 17.7 7.0 1.9 100.0
Comparison North  vs. GBA
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
Actual incidence
GBA 32.0 31.4 22.2 10.8 3.5 100.0
North 60.6 26.4 9.8 2.7 0.6 100.0
Difference -28.5 5.0 12.4 8.2 2.9
Effects
   Population -23.8 7.3 9.7 4.1 2.7
   Participation 0.4 -1.1 0.6 0.1 0.0
   Public provision -5.0 -1.2 2.1 4.0 0.2
l
l
 
Visits to a doctor 
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Potential users
North 44.6 26.3 13.7 10.6 4.8 100.0
Center 31.5 23.1 19.8 14.6 11.1 100.0
South 28.1 18.5 22.7 16.9 13.8 100.0
GBA 20.6 25.7 19.1 17.2 17.4 100.0
Argentina 30.1 24.5 18.4 14.8 12.2 100.0
2. Participation
North 27.6 27.2 34.5 44.6 33.2 30.5
Center 31.9 36.7 37.0 32.8 33.2 34.3
South 23.9 27.7 29.4 28.1 29.5 27.4
GBA 33.4 34.5 26.2 34.9 37.3 33.3
Argentina 30.5 33.3 31.9 35.2 35.2 32.7
3. Public provision
North 76.7 57.5 32.6 12.8 1.4 51.6
Center 75.1 45.7 35.0 12.8 4.2 43.0
South 80.0 65.9 58.0 16.5 9.0 50.4
GBA 81.0 65.1 54.9 30.5 15.0 50.8
Argentina 77.4 56.5 42.4 20.5 10.3 48.0
4. Incidence
North 60.0 26.2 9.8 3.9 0.1 100.0
Center 51.2 26.3 17.4 4.1 1.0 100.0
South 39.0 24.6 28.1 5.7 2.7 100.0
GBA 33.0 34.1 16.2 10.9 5.8 100.0
Argentina 45.2 29.3 15.8 6.8 2.8 100.0
Comparison North  vs. GBA
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
Actual incidence
GBA 33.0 34.1 16.2 10.9 5.8 100.0
North 60.0 26.2 9.8 3.9 0.1 100.0
Difference -26.9 7.9 6.4 7.0 5.7
Effects
   Population -22.8 7.4 7.7 5.2 2.5
   Participation 3.5 3.9 -5.0 -2.5 0.1
   Public provision -7.5 -3.5 3.6 4.4 3.0
l
l
Source: authors´ calculations based on the EDS. 
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Table 3.3 
Aggregate regional decomposition of incidence results  
Comparison North vs. GBA 
Health services, 2001 
Antenatal care
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Actual incidence
GBA 31.8 26.0 27.0 10.8 4.4 100.0
North 60.9 25.4 8.9 4.3 0.5 100.0
2. Difference -29.1 0.6 18.0 6.5 4.0
3. Effects
   Population -19.5 -0.9 11.3 6.6 2.5
   Participation 1.1 -1.4 -0.4 0.5 0.1
   Public provision -10.8 2.9 7.1 -0.6 1.3
Deliveries
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Actual incidence
GBA 42.0 21.2 25.5 8.0 3.2 100.0
North 63.8 25.4 7.0 3.4 0.3 100.0
2. Difference -21.8 -4.2 18.5 4.6 2.9
3. Effects
   Population -19.2 1.0 10.9 5.4 1.8
   Participation 0.3 -0.9 0.6 0.1 0.0
   Public provision -3.0 -4.3 7.0 -0.8 1.0
Visits to doctors
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Actual incidence
GBA 33.5 30.0 20.4 10.4 5.7 100.0
North 57.8 25.8 10.7 4.5 1.2 100.0
2. Difference -24.4 4.2 9.8 5.9 4.5
3. Effects
   Population -22.7 1.8 9.8 6.8 4.3
   Participation 0.8 3.9 -3.7 -1.1 0.2
   Public provision -2.4 -1.4 3.8 0.2 -0.1
Medicines
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Actual incidence
GBA 37.0 13.8 18.5 22.9 7.9 100.0
North 64.2 25.0 5.2 4.7 0.9 100.0
2. Difference -27.2 -11.2 13.3 18.2 7.0
3. Effects
   Population -24.8 2.0 6.9 11.3 4.6
   Participation -8.1 5.0 2.0 0.0 1.2
   Public provision 6.0 -18.4 4.3 7.0 1.0
Hospitalizations
1 2 3 4 5 Tota
1. Actual incidence
GBA 38.2 8.5 40.8 12.4 0.0 100.0
North 65.9 21.6 6.5 5.4 0.6 100.0
2. Difference -27.7 -13.1 34.3 7.1 -0.6
3. Effects
   Population -24.9 1.8 13.0 9.4 0.7
   Participation -1.8 -5.7 5.5 2.5 -0.6
   Public provision -1.0 -9.4 15.8 -4.3 -1.1
l
l
l
l
l
 
Source: authors´ calculations based on the ECV. 
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Table 3.4 
Microeconometric decompositions (Microsimulations) 
Change in the absolute value of the concentration index 1997-2001 
Antenatal Attended Medicines Hospitalizations
care deliveries
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Difference -4.8 -5.2 -11.6 -7.2
Participation 0.4 0.0 -0.8 2.1
Public provision -1.7 0.6 -3.6 -5.7
Population -3.5 -5.8 -7.2 -3.6
 
Source: authors´ calculations based on the ECV. 
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Figure 2.1 
Mean disposable income  
Argentina, 1980-2002 
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Source: CEDLAS (2003).  
 
Figure 2.2 
Concentration curves 
Antenatal care, attended delive  ry, medicines and hospitalizations, 1997 and 2001 
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